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Abstract
Exploiting unique panel data that include direct measurements of resource allocation
within households, we investigated the impact of childbirth on intrahousehold allocation
for married Japanese couples. Based on a collective model of the household, we developed
reduced-form and structural-form estimation equations that allow us to focus on private
goods to track the changes in intrahousehold resource allocation. We found one additional
child is associated with a reduction in the wife’s private expenditure share by at least
two percentage points. This may be because she substitutes more say in decisions on the
children for her own private expenditure share.
1. Introduction
Childbirth is one of the most important life events for many couples. The newborn baby
brings about new responsibilities, one of which is economic responsibility. The couple, as
parents, has to face additional expenses related to the baby, such as diapers and toys. As
the child grows up, the couple will also face other costs, such as education and medical
expenses. How does the couple cope with the additional expenses for the children? Does
the mother, father, or do both reduce their expenditure on private goods—goods enjoyed
by a single individual? This question is key to the understanding of who shoulders the
burden of the new responsibilities for the newborn. This paper is one of the first attempts
to directly answer this question.
Analysis of the impact of childbirth on intrahousehold allocations has been difficult
due to a lack of data, because most consumption data are collected at the household level.
As shown by Chiappori and Ekeland (2006), whenever the household demand function is
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compatible with the Pareto efficiency at the household level (collective rationality), it is
compatible with collective rationality with purely private consumption and also with col-
lective rationality with purely public consumption. Therefore, the nature of consumption
is not testable unless additional assumptions are made. We shall overcome this problem
by using a unique panel data set that includes direct measurement of the intrahousehold
resource allocation, or the sharing rule.
To identify the impact of childbirth on intrahousehold resource allocation, we employ
a collective model of the household, which was pioneered by Chiappori (1988, 1992).
Collective models are built on the assumption of Pareto optimality. Unlike traditional
‘unitary’models, they explicitly deal with the heterogeneity of preferences among house-
hold members. Under weak assumptions, they can be implemented by a Pareto efficient
household welfare function that is a weighted sum of the individuals’ utility functions
(Browning, Chiappori and Lechene, 2006). Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir (2005) have
extended a collective model to incorporate public goods. They show that individual wel-
fare and the decision process can be identified with either a separability assumption or
the presence of a distribution factor, which is a factor that can affect the group behav-
iour only through its impact on the decision process. However, general identification
results are not possible in a typical empirical setting, where the random error terms
in the labour supply equations and the equation for public goods expenditure are not
separable.
As with Blundell et al. (2005), we assume that household decisions are governed by
the utility functions of the husband and wife and that the expenditure for other household
members, including the children, is treated as public goods expenditure. We also assume
that private goods are separable from public goods.With this and a few other assumptions,
the movement of the household Pareto weight can be traced by the Pareto weight for the
space of private goods. Note that the purpose of this study is not to identify the changes in
the sharing rule, but to understand how a change in a distribution factor of interest affects
the sharing rule and how it relates to the movement along the household utility possibility
frontier (UPF).
Our study is different from Blundell et al. (2005) in at least five points. First, because
we have direct observation of the sharing rule, it is unnecessary to model the labour sup-
ply decisions to account for their effects on the sharing rule. We also avoid dealing with
corner solutions and keep the model simple by mainly focusing on the double-income
couples.
Second, we use a direct measurement of the time spent on domestic work and leisure
instead ofmaking the assumption that the time not spent on earning labour income is leisure
time as Blundell et al. (2005) do. While this assumption is the standard, it is inappropriate
in our study. This is because the burden of child-rearing tends to increase after childbirth
even when the time spent on earning labour income remains the same.
Third, Blundell et al. (2005) also assume that public goods expenditure can be mea-
sured, but not private goods expenditure for each member of the couple. However, the
distinction between private and public goods is not as straightforward as it may appear and
may depend on the household. To highlight this point, we can take food as an example.
Food is excludable and divisible in the usual sense and thus appears a private good. How-
ever, one could also argue that food consumption is a public good because the couple can
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enjoy the food more by consuming it jointly. If so, food should be treated as a public good
in a household where the couple usually eats together, but it should be treated as a private
good in a household where the couple usually eats separately. As this example shows, it is
difficult to measure the public goods expenditure without a somewhat arbitrary definition
of public goods in a typical empirical setting. Such arbitrary definition is unnecessary for
the most part of this study because the respondents decide what is public and what is
private.
Fourth, our approach enables us to derive a structural-form estimation equation with-
out specifying the functional form of the utility function while keeping the estimation
equations manageable. Hence, our empirical results are not driven by the choice of utility
functions.
Finally, our model explicitly deals with a variety of goods and their prices. On the
other hand, Blundell et al. (2005) treat both public goods expenditure and private goods
expenditure for each member as a Hicksian composite good.Awell-known sufficient con-
dition for the existence of a Hicksian composite good states that the relative prices of
all the component goods are constant (Hicks, 1946, p. 33), which is extremely restrictive
and unlikely to hold in practice (A slightly less restrictive condition is given by Weiss
and Sharir, 1978). In our paper, we only rely on separability, Pareto efficiency and a
few other weak assumptions. As we shall argue later, even if some of these assumptions
are violated, our reduced-form estimates still offer new and interesting empirical find-
ings.
In addition to the labour supply decisions, we also assume away fertility decisions,
because the monthly consumption decisions, which we observe in the data, are likely to
be made with the number of children taken as given. Of course, fertility decisions and
consumption decisions may be linked because they both involve bargaining within the
couple. We shall consider the implications of such a link in our empirical investigation in
subsequent sections.
As with most of the collective models in the literature, our collective model is static.
Even though Mazzocco (2004, 2007) have extended the collective models to a dynamic
setting, we chose to use a static framework for two reasons. First, in the derivation of the
estimable Euler equation, Mazzocco (2007) assumes the expected value of the distribu-
tion factor to be constant over time. This is problematic when the number of children is
in the distribution factors, because it typically tends to rise over time. Second, the Euler
estimation equations used in his studies do not answer how the resource allocation within
the couple is affected by the changes in the distribution factor.
Built on a collective household model, we develop reduced-form and structural-form
specifications. Under both specifications, we observe that the wife’s share in private expen-
diture tends to be lower with more children in the household, even after controlling for,
among other things, the changes in the wife’s income share and the level of household
income. We find that one additional child is associated with a decrease of at least 2
percentage points in a woman’s share of private expenditure.
This paper is organized as follows: section II lays out our analytical framework and
develops the estimation equations for this study. Section III discusses the data and mea-
surement issues. Section IV presents the estimation results, and finally section V provides
discussion and concluding remarks.
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II. Estimation strategy
Analytical framework
In this subsection, we lay out the analytical framework for our empirical analysis.We show
the conditions under which the changes in the household Pareto weight can be traced by
the pattern of private goods consumption. In the next two subsections, we then develop
reduced-form and structural-form estimation equations.
We assume that the unit of decision-making is a couple, where a couple consists of
a husband h and a wife w. We only considered married couples, because we lack data
on intrahousehold resource allocation for unmarried couples. A household is a unit that
includes a couple, and possibly some children and other household members. We assume
children and other household members affect the intrahousehold resource allocation only
through the couple’s decisions concerning the provision of public goods.
Now, let n andH be the total number of goods and the set of all households in the econ-
omy, respectively.We let the classification of private and public goods depend on the house-
hold.Thus,we canwrite the index sets of the private andpublic goods as Ii(H ) and Ic(H ) for the
householdH ∈H, respectively.The index set of all the goods is I≡{1,…,n}(= Ii(H )∪Ic(H )).
We let pH ∈(Rn++) be the row price vector that household H faces, where (A) is a unit
simplex for a set A. Similarly, we let piH and pcH be the row price vectors of private and
public goods, respectively. Finally, we denote the income of the household H by YH . We
shall focus on a particular household for now and drop the subscript H until the next
subsection.
We assume eachmemberm∈{h,w} has a cardinal utility functionUm :Rn+ →R+, which
is strictly an increasing, strictly concave, and twice continuously differentiable function.
In addition, we make the following assumptions:
A1: Private goods are (Leontief-Sono) separable from public goods in Um (see Black-
orby, Primont and Russell, 1978, p. 52).
A2: The allocation of resources within the household is Pareto efficient.
Under Assumption A1, m’s private goods consumption xm is determined only by pi
and the total expenditure on private goods for m. As shown in the later, our empirical
evidence is consistent with this assumption. Assumption A2 is a standard assumption for
identification in collective models (e.g. Browning and Chiappori 1998, Blundell et al.,
2005).
For any Pareto efficient allocation (x˜w, x˜h, x˜c), we have a unique household Pareto
weight ∈ [0, 1] that satisfies the following under Assumptions A1 and A2:
(x˜w, x˜h, x˜c)= argmax
(xw ,xh,xc)
Uw(xw, xc)+ (1−)Uh(xh, xc)
= argmax
(xw ,xh,xc)
U¯ w(uw(xw), xc)+(1−)U¯ h(uh(xh), xc)
s.t. pi(xw+ xh)+pcxc≤Y ,
(1)
where U¯m is a continuous, strictly increasing, and strictly quasi-concave function, and
um(xm) is a continuous, strictly increasing, and strictly concave private subutility function.
The household Pareto weight  describes the slope of the line tangent to the UPF for the
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given allocation. In what follows, we shall exclude the degenerate cases where ∈{0, 1}
because they are in effect a case of a single decision-maker.
Private goods are separable from public goods in the maximand of equation (1) under
Assumptions A1 and A2 (see Fujii and Ishikawa, 2011). As a result, we have a private-
goods expenditure y(=Y −pcxc) and a private Pareto weight  that support (x˜w, x˜h) in the
following private subproblem for any Pareto-efficient allocation (x˜w, x˜h, x˜c):
(x˜w, x˜h)= argmax
(xw ,xh)
uw(xw)+(1−)uh(xh) s.t. pi(xw+ xh)≤ y. (2)
Let us define the marginal utility with respect to private subutility evaluated at a Pareto-
efficient allocation – with some slight abuse of notation – by m≡ ∂U¯m/∂um∣∣(xm, xc)=(x˜m, x˜c)
form∈{h,w}. Notice that x˜w, x˜h and x˜c are functions of , Y and p. Thus, the wife–husband
ratio of the marginal utility ≡w/h is also a function of , Y and p. Fujii and Ishikawa
(2011) have shown that ∂/∂>0 holds if and only if the following condition is satisfied:
A3: The elasticity ≡/ ·∂/∂ satisfies >−(1−)−1 for any , Y and p.
Intuitively, one would expect  to be negative. As  increases, the private goods sub-
utility for the wife would increase, whereas that for the husband would decrease. Hence,
 would also go down since m and um tend to move in the opposite direction. Assump-
tion A3 requires that the proportional change in  be sufficiently small in absolute terms
relative to the proportional change in . In particular, Assumption A3 is violated only if
<−1, meaning that it cannot be violated provided the proportional changes in  exceed
those in  in absolute terms. Hence, Assumption A3 appears reasonable, even though we
cannot test it.
Under Assumptions A1–A3, the household Pareto weight  and the private Pareto
weight  move in the same direction. Due to the fact that  is a function of , Y and p, we
only need to examine the changes in  to follow those in  after controlling for the changes
in p and Y. Therefore, we can identify the relationship between the distribution factors and
the Pareto weight  from the private subproblem.
Reduced-form specification
Under Assumptions A1–A3, we can identify the movement along the household UPF by
the private Pareto weight. Since the allocation of private goods is determined by the prices
pi of private goods, the expenditure on private goods y and the private Pareto weight , a
natural candidate for a proxy measure of  is the wife’s share in private-goods expenditure.
We shall call this the sharing rule defined as s≡pixw/y≡yw/y= yw/ (yw+ yh), where ym is
member m’s private-goods expenditure. As discussed in the next section, our unique data
contain the direct measurement of ym and thus s.
We assume that  is a function of distribution factors z, which include the num-
ber of children in our study. We allow z to be potentially preference shifters as well,
because some variables may indeed be both preference shifters and distribution factors
and because it is often difficult to isolate the effects of distribution factors from those of
closely related preference shifters in empirical applications. However, some structure must
be imposed for identification. We require z to be sharing-rule neutral, which is defined
below:
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A4: The distribution factors z are sharing-rule neutral if the sharing rule can be written
as s(pi, y,((z),P,Y )).
In other words, z may affect the preference structure, but it affects s only through
changes in . The following is an example of a sharing-rule-neutral preference shifter.
Example 1. Suppose each m∈{h,w} has a log-linear preference of the form m ln xm+
(1 − m) ln xc, where xm ∈ R+ and xc ∈ R+ are m’s private-good and public-good
consumption, respectively. We assume the number n of children affects both the prefer-
ence parameter m and the household Pareto weight (=). Further, suppose we can write
m(n)=m0 g(n) for some constant m0 and some function g(·). Then, we have s=w0 (w0 +
(1− )h0)−1. The changes in n affects s only through the changes in , and not through
those in m in this case. Hence, n is a sharing-rule-neutral preference shifter.
With the sharing-rule neutrality assumption, we can consider the following reduced-
form specification:
s˜H =	0+	1 ln yH +
∑
j∈I
	2,j ln pj,H + f ()+ ˜H
=	0+	1 ln yH +
∑
j∈I
	2,j ln pj,H +
Q∑
q=1
	q3zq,H + H,
(3)
where yH, pj,H and zq,H are, respectively, the expenditure on private goods, the price
of the jth good and the qth distribution factor at time  for the household H. Further,
f : (0, 1)→R is a monotonic function, s˜ the ‘latent’ sharing rule and H the error term. In
what follows, the subscripts j and q denote the jth good and qth distribution factor, respec-
tively. Note here that s is doubly censored at zero and one so that s=min(1, max(0, s˜)).
We will subsequently check the prevalence of the censoring of s and its consequences.
There are five points to make here. First, because  depends on income Y , we include
the logarithmic income in the set of regressors z. Second, because s is homogeneous of
degree zero in y and pi, we must have:
	1+
∑
j∈Ii
	2,j =0, (4)
which can be used to test the validity of the reduced-form specification.
Third, there is potentially an endogeneity problem in estimating equation (3). On aver-
age, women wish to have slightly more children than men in Japan. According to the
Public Opinion Survey on the Social Awareness for Year 2002 conducted by the Japa-
nese government, the desired fertility rate is 2.71 for married women with children and
2.33 for those without children. The corresponding figures for married men are 2.69 and
2.24, respectively.1 Hence, a large number of children in the household may be due to a
woman’s (unobservable) strong bargaining power within that household, which also tends
to raise . In this case, zH and H may be correlated and the regression results are biased
unless the endogeneity problem is appropriately dealt with. However, the endogeneity
1Due to the selection into marriage, unmarried women have a lower desired fertility rate than unmarried
men. On average, however, women still have a higher desired fertility rate than men. See http://www8.cao.
go.jp/survey/h14/h14-shakai/ 2-3.html for further details.
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problem is unlikely to be severe because the desired fertility rates for men and women
are not very different. We will verify this using instrument variables for the number of
children.
Fourth, while Assumption A4 is not weak or testable, we can still interpret the results
when it is violated. In such a case, the estimated impact of z on the sharing rule can be
interpreted as the ‘sharing-rule-neutrality equivalent’. That is, we attribute all the impact
to the changes in the Pareto weight, even though the observed changes in the sharing rule
may be partly due to preference changes.
Note here that preference shifters are typically ignored in the available literature. For
example, Blundell et al. (2005) implicitly assume that the distribution factor only affects
the Pareto weight and not the individual utility functions. Bourguignon, Browning and
Chiappori (2009) explicitly incorporate preference shifters in their model, but they ignore
their effects by effectively fixing the preference shifters. In fact, the identification strategies
in these studies will not work without additional assumptions if a factor could simulta-
neously affect both the preferences and the Pareto weight. Therefore, while Assumption
A4 is admittedly strong, it is still less restrictive than the assumptions typically (and often
implicitly) made in the available literature because we at least allow for the presence of
some preference shifters.
Finally, Assumptions A1–A4 are necessary for using the sharing rule s to identify
the changes in the Pareto weight . However, these assumptions are not essential for
deriving equation (3). The reduced-form specification provides a useful description of
data because s is a quantity of interest on its own, even if Assumptions A1–A4 are
violated.
Structural-form specification
The reduced-form specification in the previous subsection is simple and straightforward
and the estimated coefficients have a straightforward interpretation. However, the reduced-
form specification is not without problems. First, the introduction of the ‘latent’ sharing
rule is artificial and has no obvious economic interpretation. Second, the private Pareto
weight changeswhen um is affine-transformed,which is theoretically unattractive.Hence,
instead of just linearly approximating the sharing rule, we use economic theory to impose
additional structure and transform the problem so that the measurement unit or the origin
of um does not matter.
The structural-form specification we consider below has two additional advantages.
First, the estimation equation for the structural-form specification is closely related to the
price independent generalize linear (PIGL) preference (seeMuellbauer 1975) and risk atti-
tudes of the couple, which provides additional insights into the intrahousehold resource
allocation. Second, besides the condition of homogeneity of degree zero, the structural-
form specification comes with additional restrictions on the coefficients, which we can use
to test the validity of the specification.
Let us start with the first-order conditions of the private subproblem. Since the allo-
cation in the private subproblem is Pareto-efficient, we have ∂uw/∂xwl = (1−)∂uh/∂xhl .
Now, let vm be the indirect utility function corresponding to um.We use subscripts to denote
the partial derivatives of vm. For example, the marginal utility of private goods expenditure
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for m is vmy (ym,pi)≡∂vm(ym,pi)/∂ym. Then, noting that the marginal utilities for direct and
indirect utility functions satisfy ∂um/∂xmj =pijvmy (ym,pi), we must have:
vwy (yw,pi)=(1−)vhy(yh,pi)⇐⇒vwy (sy,pi)=(1−)vhy((1− s)y,pi)
⇐⇒ ln 
1− = ln v
h
y((1− s)y,pi)− ln vwy (sy,pi).
(5)
By totally differentiating the above equation and dropping the arguments, we have:
d
[
ln

1−
]
=−
[
vhyy
vhy
+ v
w
yy
vwy
]
y ds+
[
vhyy(1− s)
vhy
− v
w
yys
vwy
]
dy+
∑
j∈Ii
[
vhpjy
vhy
− v
w
pjy
vwy
]
dpj. (6)
We obviously have vmy >0 as um is strictly increasing in all arguments. In addition, the
second-order condition in the private subproblem implies vmyy <0. Thus, the coefficient on
ds is positive. The following lemma,2 which follows from Roy’s identity, is useful for
interpreting other terms in equation (6).
Lemma 1. Let xmj (ym,pi) be m’s Marshallian demand function for private good j∈ Ii.
Then, we have:
vmpijy
vmy
=−∂x
m
j
∂ym
− v
m
yy
vmy
xmj (ym,pi)= (Rm−
mj )
xmj
ym
, (7)
where Rm≡−vmyyym/ vmy (>0), and 
mj ≡ y/xmj ·∂xmj /∂y.
Note that 
mj is just the income elasticity of demand for private good j. Rm is a measure
of the relative risk aversion, when prices are fixed. In our empirical analysis, we assume
away the price dependence of Rm as with other studies on risk. Since we do not explicitly
deal with uncertainty, one may object to the use of the term ‘risk aversion’ here. Then, Rm
can be simply taken as a measure of the curvature of the utility function. This alternative
interpretation does not change the subsequent analysis.
Using Lemma 1,we obtain from equation (6) an expression that is invariant with respect
to affine transformations of vm:
Proposition 1. Let us denote the expenditure share of private good j in m’s private expen-
diture bymj =pjxmj (ym)−1. Then, letting *≡− ln(−1−1) and s*≡− ln(s−1−1), we have
the following expression:
ds*= 1
(sRh+(1− s)Rw)d
*+ (R
h−Rw)
(sRh+(1− s)Rw)d(ln y)
+
∑
j∈Ii
(
hj −Rh)hj − (
wj −Rw)wj
(sRh+(1− s)Rw) d(ln pj).
(8)
Further, assuming that |r|	 1, and taking the Taylor approximation of equation (8),
we have the following estimable form:
2Proofs of the lemma and propositions in this study are given in Fujii and Ishikawa (2011).
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ds*= R˜−1(1+ rt)d*+ r d(ln y)+
∑
j∈Ii
[
(R˜
−1

˜j−1)j + R˜
−1
(r
˜j−
j )j t
−R˜−1r
jj t2+(R˜
−1

j − r)˜j + r
j R˜
−1
t˜j
]
d (ln pj)+O(r2),
(9)
where R˜≡2−1(Rh+Rw), r≡ R˜−1(Rh−Rw), ˜j≡swj +(1−s)hj , t≡2−1−s, j ≡hj −wj ,

j ≡
hj −
wj and 
˜j≡2−1(
hj +
wj ).
A few remarks on equation (8) are in order. First, note that ∂s*/∂*>0. Hence, after
controlling for ln y and ln pi, the changes in s* reflect the changes in * and thus the changes
in . The sensitivity of s* to *, therefore, depends on the average of the relative risk aver-
sion for the couple, weighted by the private expenditure share of the other member in the
couple.
In general, when both members of the couple are more risk averse, s* is less sensitive
to the changes in *. Risk averse individuals have a high marginal utility of private goods
when their consumption of private goods is low. As a result, when the couple is highly
risk averse, a transfer from the relatively better-off to the relatively worse-off dramatically
increases the utility of the latter. This, in turn, means that the UPF for the private subprob-
lem is very concave. Thus, the change in the slope of the line tangent to the private UPF
translates into only a small change in s*.
Second, in addition to the changes in *, s* is also affected by the changes in y and pi.
The response of s* to total private goods expenditure y is ambiguous. It depends on the
difference in the relative risk aversion between the husband and wife. Notice here that the
marginal utility of private goods expenditure weighted by the private Pareto weight must
be equated so that vwy = (1−)vhy . When the wife is more risk averse than the husband,
and  and s are fixed, vwy tends to decrease faster than vhy as y goes up. Thus, to restore
vwy = (1−)vhy , s must go down so that vwy increases and vhy decreases. The effect of price
pi on s is also ambiguous. When the wife is more risk averse than the husband, rises in the
prices of goods for which her income elasticity is low and her share in her private-goods
expenditure is high tend to increase s.
Third, the sharing rule affects ∂s*/∂* when the husband andwife have different coeffi-
cients of relative risk aversion as implied by Proposition 2. Hence, the relationship between
the left- and right-handside variablesmay depend on s˜ in equation (3), whichmeans that the
reduced-form estimation results may only describe the average relationship. Proposition 2
also shows that the constancy of ∂s*/∂* is related to the PIGL preference for both the
husband and wife.
Proposition 2. The following three conditions are equivalent:
1. The coefficient (Rhs+Rw(1− s))−1 on d* in Proposition 1 does not depend on the
sharing rule s, private expenditure y, or prices pi.
2. There is a constant R such that Rh=Rw=R.
3. vm(ym,p) has a PIGL form, and the couple has a common coefficient of relative risk
aversionwith respect to ym. In otherwords, for each ofm∈{w,h}, we canwrite vm as
vm(ym,p)=am(p)c(ym;R)+bm(p), where R is a constant, c(ym;R) is a CRRA utility
function: c(ym;R)=((ym)1−R−1)(1−R)−1 if R /=1, and c(ym;R)= ln ym if R=1.
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To derive an estimation equation, we replace the small variation by the within-sample
deviation in equation (9). For example, lettingH and  be the subscripts for household and
time, and s¯*H ≡ 1T
∑T
=1 sH, we replace ds* by s*H ≡ s*H − s¯*H . Similarly, we let ln yH and
ln pij,H be themean of ln yH and ln pij,H over the observation periods, and replace d(ln y) and
d(ln pij,H) by  ln yH ≡ ln yH − ln yH and  ln pij,H ≡ ln pij,H − ln pij,H . Further, we assume
that after controlling for price changes, *H can be explained by the changes in a set
of explanatory variables {z1H, . . . , zQH}, so that *H = ¯H + 0+
∑Q
q=1 
q
1z
q
H +
∑
j∈I 
j
2
ln pj,H +H, where H is an error term. Letting t¯H =2−1− (1+ exp(−s¯*H ))−1, we have
the following estimation equation:
s*H =	0+	2 t¯H +
Q∑
q=1
[
	q1z
q
H +	q3 t¯HzqH
]+	4 ln yH
+
∑
j∈I
[
	j5 ln pj,H +	j6 t¯H ln pj,H
]
+
∑
j∈Ii
[
	j7 t¯
2
H ln pj,H +	j8˜H,j ln pj,H +	j9˜H,j t¯H ln pj,H
]
+ H. (10)
Comparing equations (9) and (10) (see Fujii and Ishikawa 2011, for the derivation), we
have the following restrictions on the coefficients:
	q3
	q1
=	4= 	
j
9
	j8+	4
(= r) for ∀j∈ Ii. (11)
Further, because s is homogeneous of degree zero in y and pi, we must have
	4+
∑
j∈I
	j5=
∑
j∈I
	j6=
∑
j∈Ii
	j7=
∑
j∈Ii
	j8=
∑
j∈Ii
	j9=0. (12)
Aswith equation (4) in the reduced-form specification, equations (11) and (12) can serve
as a specification test. By simply testing r=0, we can also test whether both the husband
and wife have a PIGL indirect utility function with a common coefficient of relative risk
aversion.While the PIGL indirect utility function is not required for our empirical analysis,
we do require |r|	1 for equation (10) to be a good approximation of equation (8).
III. Data and measurement issues
The primary data source for our empirical investigation is nine rounds of the Japanese
Panel Survey of Consumers (JPSC) between 1994 and 2002, which uses stratified two-
stage sampling with a total of 23 strata and 125 enumeration areas. For the main part
of our analysis, we use a subsample of double-income married couples cohabiting at the
time of observation, which accounts for about a third of the married couples in the JPSC
data. Because the structural-form estimation requires us to calculate within-sample devi-
ations, we use only the records for respondents (wife) for whom we have at least three
observations. After excluding the records with missing data, we are left with 2,079 obser-
vations and 412 women.About 20 % of the latter gave birth to at least one child within the
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observation periods.3 Because the children of the respondents are relatively young as shown
in Section (a) of Table 1, they can be safely considered dependents.
The expenditure section of the JPSC questionnaires has two components. The first com-
ponent, which is unique, directly asks about the ‘beneficiary’ of the expenditure. In other
words, the respondents are asked to break down the total expenditure into the amounts
spent for the husband, wife, family as a whole, children and all other household mem-
bers. This component allows us to measure directly the private expenditure ym (and thus
s) without arbitrarily treating certain goods as private or public goods.
We treat the expenditure for the husband and wife as private expenditure. The response
to this question is subjective, because it is the respondent who determines the beneficiary
of the expenditure. However, the self-reporting nature of the data poses little problem here,
because the panel structure of the data allows us to control for the self-reporting effect and
other unobserved heterogeneity among respondents.
In the second component of the expenditure section, the questionnaire asks how much
money was spent in the month of September in the survey year on each of the following 11
expenditure categories: (A) food, (B) housing, (C) utility, (D) furniture and household uten-
sils, (E) clothes and footwear, (F) medical care, (G) transportation, (H) communication, (I)
education, (J) reading and recreation, and (K) other miscellaneous.4 The two expenditure
components are independently asked. Hence, we are unaware of the breakdown of each
expenditure category by beneficiaries. For example, we know the aggregate amount of
expenditure on clothes, but not how much of it was spent on the wife’s clothes. Therefore,
we cannot tell from the data which goods are private and which goods are public.
While the second component is a standard format for expenditure surveys, it is inconve-
nient for analysing intrahousehold allocation. This is because we cannot directly calculate
ym or s from this format. Of course, it is always possible to subjectively assign the ben-
eficiary of each expenditure category. For example, Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1997)
treat the expenditure on women’s clothes as private expenditure for the wife, which may
appear reasonable. However, this approach can be misleading because the expenditure on
women’s clothesmay not accurately reflect thewife’s total private expenditure and because
the husband may also derive utility from fancy clothes for women. The first expenditure
component of the JPSC data allow us to making subjective judgments about the definition
of private goods.
As Section (b) of Table 1 shows, couples with no kids have on average the highest pri-
vate expenditure for both the husband and wife. For both, the average private expenditure
drops after the first child, and the drop is higher for the wife than the husband. While the
wife’s average private expenditure tends to decline with the second and third children, the
husband’s expenditure changes little. Thus, the increased expenditures due to the children
seem to be accommodated at least partly by the reduction in the wife’s private expenditure
share.
There are three reasons why this does not necessarily mean that the wife is shouldering
a disproportionate burden for the additional children. First, one could argue that wives
may be simply deferring consumption. This is plausible because various costs associated
3See http://www.kakeiken.or.jp/en/index.html for further information about the data.
4Other miscellaneous includes remittances to children and parents as well as social expenses. Loan repayments
are not included in the expenditure section.
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TABLE 1
Descriptive statistics of the double-income sample
Number of children 0 1 2 3+ Total
(a) Demographics
Husband’s age 34.55 36.46 38.21 39.44 37.50
Wife’s age 31.43 33.90 35.53 36.25 34.70
Average age of children —– 6.17 8.57 9.01 6.84
(b) Expenditure, savings and income (JPY 10,000 per month)
Total expenditure 22.66 22.10 25.43 25.88 24.42
Expenditure for husband 4.54 3.75 4.08 3.94 4.06
Expenditure for wife 2.75 2.03 1.96 1.87 2.08
Expenditure for family as a whole 14.19 12.21 13.39 13.62 13.32
Expenditure for children 0.00 2.78 4.30 4.87 3.43
Total saving 9.93 8.16 8.98 8.93 8.96
Saving for husband 1.79 1.66 1.78 1.57 1.72
Saving for wife 1.79 1.27 1.35 1.28 1.39
Saving for family as a whole 6.05 3.99 3.77 3.40 4.10
Saving for children 0.02 1.03 1.72 2.24 1.41
Husband’s disposable income 26.31 27.06 28.42 29.16 27.95
Wife’s disposable income 14.63 12.39 12.41 13.17 12.88
(c) Time use
Husband’s hours for leisure 4.14 3.37 3.55 3.33 3.57
Husband’s hours for work 7.70 7.66 7.85 7.82 7.78
Husband’s hours for domestic work 0.39 1.24 0.97 1.23 0.98
Wife’s hours for leisure 3.64 2.66 2.53 2.33 2.70
Wife’s hours for work 5.49 4.75 5.05 4.94 5.04
Wife’s hours for domestic work 3.09 5.23 5.32 5.80 5.04
(d) Wife’s income and expenditure shares
Private expenditure (narrow) 37.18 35.14 29.42 30.57 31.95
Private expenditure (extended) 39.58 34.56 31.17 31.51 33.21
Disposable income (narrow) 35.17 29.99 29.45 29.43 30.45
Disposable income (extended) 44.61 43.12 42.69 43.42 43.20
(e) Categorical expenditure shares
A Food 28.04 30.82 31.67 32.17 31.08
B Housing 14.70 6.03 5.02 4.21 6.46
C Furniture 1.88 2.06 2.54 1.89 2.24
D Utility 10.01 9.43 8.99 9.66 9.34
E Clothes and footwear 5.58 5.10 4.78 4.77 4.95
F Medical Care 2.43 2.87 2.79 2.99 2.79
G Transportation 9.79 8.25 7.90 7.51 8.16
H Communication 6.20 4.97 4.74 4.79 5.00
I Education 0.30 6.97 10.87 11.58 8.76
J Reading and recreation 10.38 9.58 8.86 10.10 9.44
K Other miscellaneous 10.68 13.92 11.84 10.33 11.77
Public I (C+D+F) 14.32 14.35 14.32 14.55 14.37
Public II (B+C+D+F+I) 29.32 27.36 30.22 30.34 29.59
Public III (B+C+D+F+G+I+K) 49.79 49.53 49.95 48.17 49.52
Number of observations [Sections(a)–(d)] 324 408 993 354* 2079
Number of observations [Section (e)] 183 230 611 235 1259
Notes: Categorical expenditure share data are available only from 1998.
*332, 19 and 3 obs. for three-, four- and five-child households.
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with money-spending activities may increase after childbirth. For example, it may become
necessary to hire a baby-sitter or use a day-care centre when wives go out, because they
are the primary caretakers of children in the majority of Japanese households.
To see whether wives are indeed simply deferring consumption, we examine the pattern
of household savings. The JPSC questionnaire asks about the breakdown of the savings by
the beneficiaries in the same way as the expenditure. Hence, we can take private savings
as the present value of the wife’s future consumption in our static framework.5 Section (b)
also shows that private savings for the wife decline substantially after the first child. How-
ever, there is no such clear pattern for husband. Thus, we have no evidence to support
deferred consumption for the wife.
Second, the wife may be simply substituting leisure-time consumption for private con-
sumption. However, the summary statistics reported in Section (c) of Table 1 provide no
evidence for such a substitution. The average number of daily hours spent on leisure for the
husband and wife tends to decrease as they have more children, and the decrease is larger
for the wife. Hence, the wife does not appear to be compensated for her reduction in private
expenditure share by longer leisure time. Because the aggregate statistics alone are incon-
clusive, we shall incorporate the value of leisure time when calculating private expenditure
share in the subsequent analysis, a point we shall discuss in detail subsequently.
Third, one could also argue that the apparently disproportionate burden of children on
wives may simply be due to the changes in the relative contribution to household income.
It is common for working women to switch to less demanding (and lower paid) jobs or
reduce their working hours after childbirth. This, in turn, changes the relative earnings
within the couple. To see whether this is indeed the case, we looked at the average dispos-
able salary income (after tax and social security contributions) for the couple. As Section
(d) of Table 1 shows, the disposable income for the husband tends to go up with more
children. On the other hand, the wife’s disposable income, on average, peaks when she has
no children. Hence, the changes in relative contribution to household income may be part
of the reason why the wife’s private expenditure share falls after childbirth.
This calculation does not include the value of domestic services, such as baby-sitting
and cleaning, even though this should be included from a theoretical perspective. That is,
domestic services are consumed evenwhen the couple themselves are providing the domes-
tic service, since the self-provision of domestic service can be interpreted in the following
manner: the couple ‘hires’ either the husband or wife to get domestic services, and the
‘employee’ receives the payment. As shown by this illustration, the value of domestic ser-
vices produced by the couple should be incorporated when calculating their contributions
to the household income.
To evaluate the value of leisure time and domestic service, we first calculate the wage
rate by dividing the disposable income by the number of hours worked per month. Sub-
sequently, we multiply the wage rate by the number of hours spent on leisure per month
to evaluate the monetary value of leisure time. Similarly, the value of domestic service
is estimated at the number of hours spent on domestic work multiplied by the wage rate.
We shall hereafter call the definitions of expenditure and income in the raw data set the
5Obviously, there is no guarantee that the wife’s private savings will indeed go to private expenditure for herself
in the future. However, there is little chance that the husband will be able to spend her private savings without her
consent, because joint accounts are not available in Japan.
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narrow definitions. The extended definitions of expenditure and income include private
savings and the value of leisure time and domestic work.
Section (d) of Table 1 also shows that the wife’s share in both income and expenditure
become, on average, closer to one half under the extended definitions. However, the gap
between the income and expenditure widens under the extended definitions, as expected
from the preceding discussions.
Do the extended definitions help improve our analysis of the allocation parameter?
The answer appears to be affirmative. Under the narrow definitions, the correlation be-
tween the wife’s share of disposable income and her share in private expenditure is 26.1%.
On the other hand, the corresponding figure is 30.2% under the extended definitions.
In addition, the explanatory power of our econometric models is better under the ex-
tended definitions. Hence, from both a theoretical and empirical perspective, we prefer the
extended definitions of income and expenditure. While the results reported in the next
section are entirely based on the extended definition, Fujii and Ishikawa (2011) show
that the results based on the narrow definition are both quantitatively and qualitatively
similar.
The discussion has so far highlighted the fact that married women with a larger number
of children tend to have a lower private expenditure share sH. However, it is not yet clear
whether the lower share sH is purely due to the lower share in the mother’s disposable
income, or as a result of an ‘extra’ reduction due to the larger number of children. Thus,
we answer in subsequent sections, ‘Do women give up their share of private expenditure
to cope with additional expenditure for the children on top of what can be explained away
by the lower contribution to the household income?’
Let us briefly discuss a few issues associated with the estimation of equation (10). Note
first that the 	j7, 	
j
8 and 	
j
9 terms involve only the prices of private goods. As we argued
earlier, it is difficult to determine a priori which goods should be private for a given
household. Thus, we initially treat all the 11 categories of goods as if they were private.
Under the separability assumption, the prices of public goods included in pH would only
act as random noise and the consistency of the estimate remains unaffected, provided that
it is uncorrelated with the error term. Thus, the inclusion of all the categories does no
obvious harm to the estimation.
We face a similar problem for ˜H,j, which is a vector of the average categorical shares
of private goods expenditure. One way to deal with this issue is, again, to include all the
11 categories. However, this approach is not fully satisfactory. If the expenditure shares
for public goods capture some of the variations in  not explained by z, then the estimates
will be biased.
Hence, we also considered an alternative approach inwhichwe drop from equation (10)
all the terms involving ˜H,j. This is in effect equivalent to treating ˜ as an unobserved
random variable with an additive error structure, so that the consistency of the estimates
for 	0, 	q1, 	2, 	3 and 	4 remains unaffected. This approach has also an additional advantage
that both the subjective definition of private goods and the categorical share data, the latter
of which is available only from 1998, become unnecessary.
To implement the specification tests equations (4), (11) and (12), we need working
definitions of Ii. Summary statistics and introspection provide some guidance as to which
goods are likely to be private for most households. Section (e) of Table 1 presents the
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expenditure share in percentage points by the 11 categories. The shares for furniture, util-
ity and medical care do not fluctuate much. These categories, particularly the first two, are
likely to be public for most households, because every household member benefits from
the expenditure the same way. They also appear consistent with weak separability because
they are unaffected by the composition of the shares for other categories. The aggregate
share of these three categories (Public I) is also stable.
Section (e) of Table 1 also shows that the shares for some categories, such as food and
education, tend to go up with the number of children. On the other hand, the shares for
clothes and footwear, and housing tend to go down. Education and housing are public in
nature and appear to be substitutable because the sum of these categories is reasonably
stable. Public II includes education and housing categories in addition to Public I goods.
Transportation and other miscellaneous include some public component, because both
include services that benefit everyone in the household. Public III includes these two
categories, in addition to the Public II goods. To devise working definitions of private
goods (for most households), we take the complement of the set of public goods in
the universe of all goods. For example, Private I consists of A, B, E, G, H, I, J and
K.
Note that the expenditure share of public goods does not fluctuate much with the num-
ber of children, regardless of the definition of public goods. Hence, the observed shares
are consistent with the log-linear preference with respect to aggregate private and public
goods, provided relevant aggregator functions exist. Due to the fact log-linear preference
implies the weak separability of private goods from public goods, our three definitions of
public goods appear reasonable. We can use these definitions to check whether the specifi-
cation tests are passed.However, the specification tests cannot reveal definitive conclusions
because the testing procedure requires a choice of the definition of private goods, which
is bound to be arbitrary to some extent.
We merged three additional data sets into the JPSC data. First, since the JPSC data do
not contain price information, wemerged it with the Consumer Price Index (CPI) collected
by the Statistics Bureau, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. The CPI
is available for each of the 11 expenditure categories in the JPSC for the capital city of
each of the 47 prefectures. We constructed the CPI for each expenditure category, for each
prefecture, for each municipality size (i.e. large cities, other cities and towns) and for each
year by assuming that the price ratios between the three sizes of municipality were uniform
nationwide in each expenditure category.
Second, we compiled population estimates and population censuses published by the
Statistics Bureau to obtain the population by prefecture, gender and year for each of the
5-year age groups.6We calculated the female-male ratio of the age group around the respon-
dents’age and included this variable in the regressors as a proxy for the respondent’s outside
options in the marriage market, which may affect the intrahousehold resource allocation.
Finally, we collected prefectural-level variables for each year between 1994 and 2002 from
various issues of the Japanese Statistical Yearbook (JSY) to use as instrumental variables
for the number of children.
6The population data we used can be downloaded from the Portal Site of Official Statistics of Japan (http://www.
e-stat.go.jp/SG1/ estat/eStatTopPortalE.do).
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IV. Estimation results
Reduced-form regressions
To assess various estimation issues, we first ran reduced-form regressions with a number
of estimation methods. The baseline regression results for the reduced-form specification
are presented in Table 2.
Our primary interest is in the coefficient on the number of children. For example, the
pooled OLS results in Table 2 show that one additional child is associated with a 2.6 per-
centage point reduction in the wife’s share of private expenditure. The P-values for the
Wald test of equation (4) under the three alternative definitions of private goods are reported
at the bottom of Table 2. In each definition and using each estimation method, equation (4)
was not rejected. Hence, we have no evidence to suggest that our definitions of private
goods or the reduced-form equation (3) are inappropriate, at least for the double-income
sample.
Because of the potential endogeneity problem discussed earlier, the OLS estimator
may be biased because the number of children may be correlated with the unobserved
bargaining power. Thus, we ran a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression in which the
number of children was instrumented. The estimation results are also reported in Table 2.
TABLE 2
Baseline regression results of equation (3) for the double-income sample
Estimation Pooled OLS 2SLS FE FE-2SLS
	0 Constant −0.249 (1.417) 0.181 (3.070) 0.521 (2.057) −2.356 (5.778)
	1 ln y 0.001 (0.008) −0.005 (0.013) 0.004 (0.010) −0.024 (0.019)
	2 A (Food) 0.562** (0.190) 0.234 (0.356) −0.084 (0.256) −0.547 (0.707)
B (Hse) −0.068 (0.063) 0.096 (0.098) 0.347** (0.123) −0.576* (0.293)
C (Util) 0.086 (0.108) 0.095 (0.202) −0.157 (0.164) 0.282 (0.563)
D (Furn) 0.194** (0.062) −0.007 (0.104) 0.098 (0.126) −0.805** (0.308)
E (Clth) −0.010 (0.089) 0.130 (0.157) −0.173 (0.139) −0.201 (0.357)
F (Med) 0.043 (0.116) 0.125 (0.275) 0.054 (0.154) 0.257 (0.546)
G (Trans) 0.455* (0.224) 0.288 (0.427) 0.639* (0.279) 0.371 (0.741)
H (Comm) −0.406** (0.119) −0.417 (0.337) −0.192 (0.147) 0.631 (0.743)
I (Educ) −0.409** (0.140) −0.598* (0.250) −0.550* (0.254) −0.727 (0.554)
J (Rec) −0.450** (0.144) −0.058 (0.250) 0.031 (0.243) 0.775 (0.652)
K (Oth) 0.167 (0.160) 0.133 (0.257) 0.141 (0.277) 0.423 (0.620)
	3 # children −0.026** (0.003) −0.024* (0.010) −0.026* (0.011) −0.103 (0.067)
Fem. ratio −0.137 (0.231) −0.060 (0.402) 0.015 (0.735) 0.423 (1.758)
ln Y −0.002 (0.013) 0.005 (0.022) −0.023 (0.018) 0.020 (0.057)
Inc. share 0.366** (0.030) 0.384** (0.052) 0.423** (0.045) 0.446** (0.103)
Obs. 2079 673 2079 673
R2 0.135 0.143 0.094 0.060
Equation (4), Pr. I 0.957 0.826 0.754 0.450
Equation (4), Pr. II 0.349 0.697 0.475 0.334
Equation (4), Pr. III 0.130 0.800 0.206 0.140
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*Significant at a 5% level.
**Significant at a 1% level.
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We have used as instrumental variables the number of children that the wife wants to
have,7 and the JSY variables that proxy the quality of the child-rearing environment.8 The
desired fertility rate only reflects the preferences and is unlikely to be strongly correlated
with the unobserved bargaining power. The quality of the child-rearing environment is
likely positively correlated with the number of children. The χ2-statistic for the score test
of overidentification (Wooldridge, 1995) for the 2SLS regression is χ213=18.13 with the
corresponding P-value of 0.153. Hence, we have no statistical evidence that questions the
validity of our instrumental variables. Further, we could not reject a robust Hausman test
of endogeneity. Hence, the endogeneity of the number of children do not appear important
in our estimation. Indeed, the coefficients on the number of children for the OLS and 2SLS
regressions are similar.
One might argue that fertility decisions and future consumption decisions are made
simultaneously. In this case, the unobserved bargaining power would bias the estimation.
Given that wives tend to desire more children than husbands, the estimated coefficient on
the number of children is underestimated in an absolute value. However, our conjecture is
that such a bias is unlikely important for two reasons. First, there is no commitment mech-
anism for future consumption and thus a simultaneous decision is unlikely enforceable.
Second, Mazzocco (2007) favours the no-commitment inter-temporal collective model
over the unitarymodel and the full-efficiency inter-temporal collective model, even though
the results are based on a US data set. Note also that even if our conjecture is wrong and
even if our estimates suffer from the endogeneity problem, our estimates of the negative
impact of children on the sharing rule are conservative.
Up to now,we have pooled the sample and ignored the respondent-specificfixed-effects
(FE), which are potentially important. Thus, let us now turn to the FEmodel.9 This model is
attractive because we can control for all the unobservable characteristics of the respondent
that do not vary over time, which may include the respondents’ self-reporting effect, the
couple’s wealth at the time of marriage and so forth. As shown in Table 2, one more child
is associated with a sharing rule that is 2.6 percentage points lower in the FE model.
Finally, we have also estimated the fixed-effects two-stage least square (FE-2SLS)
model.As Table 2 shows, the standard errors are much higher than other estimates because
the variations in the instrumental variables are quite limited in the FE regression. How-
ever, the qualitative results remain the same, and the FE-2SLS point estimates are not
significantly different from the OLS point estimates.
Four remarks are in order here. First, the level of income does not systematically affect
the allocation parameter. The coefficient on logarithmic income was not statistically sig-
nificant at a 5% level, and the point estimate was very small. Second, our results clearly
reject the income-pooling hypothesis; the estimated coefficient on the income share is
between 0.366 and 0.446, which is both economically and statistically significant. Thus, a
single percentage point increase in the wife’s disposable income share is associated with
7This question was asked only in 1994, 1997 and 2000. Unfortunately, there is no information on the desired
fertility rate of the husband.
8The following instrumental variables are used: # nurseries, # kindergartens, # clinics, # primary schools, # sec-
ondary schools, # public parks, # accidents, # incidence of pollution (all per thousand people), student–teacher ratio
(STR) in nurseries, STR in kindergartens, STR in primary schools, STR in secondary schools and the infant mortality
rate.
9The R2 measure for the FE models refers to the within R2 in this paper.
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an increase of approximately 0.4 percentage point in the sharing rule after controlling for
other factors, including the wife’s disposable income share.
Third, because thewife’s disposable income share tends to decreasewithmore children,
it is useful to consider the total effect of childbirth on the sharing rule. To this end, we
regress the disposable income share on all the other regressors. In the case of the pooled
OLS model, the estimated coefficient on the number of children is −0.018. Hence, the
total effect of childbirth on the sharing rule is about −0.033(=−0.026− 0.018 · 0.366)
percentage points. Therefore, the effect of childbirth on intrahousehold allocation through
changes in income shares represents about 20% of the total effect of childbirth. The results
are similar for the FE model.
Structural-form regressions
Let us now turn to the estimation results for the structural-form specification equation (10).
We first consider a regression model in which all the categorical shares ˜ are deemed pri-
vate.We only report the FE estimates in this section.10 The estimated coefficients for 	0, 	1,
	2, 	3 and 	4 are reported in the left-side column of Table 3. Other estimates are reported
in Fujii and Ishikawa (2011).
The interpretation of the estimated coefficients for the structural-form specification
requires caution. First, the left-hand side variable is the change in the logit transforma-
tion of the sharing rule from a reference point. Hence, the coefficients reported in Table 3
are not directly comparable to those in Table 2. Second, changes in the z variables affect
intrahousehold resource allocation through two channels – through the 	q1z
q
H term and
through the 	q3 t¯Hz
q
H term. Therefore, depending on the level of t¯, the impact of children
on the intrahousehold allocation can be positive or negative. Let us take the results for all
˜ as an example. In this case, when t¯ >0.449≈ 0.384/0.856, or s¯ <0.051, the marginal
impact of a child is positive. In other words, the model predicts that an additional child
can increase the sharing rule, only when the sharing rule at the reference point is less than
5%.
At the bottom of Table 3, we report the P-values for the Wald tests for equations (11)
and (12). The former was strongly rejected for models with all ˜, when the definition of
private goods is Private I or II. Thus, our structural-form estimation appears to be valid
only when the definition of private goods is Private III. Even then, equation (12) can be
rejected at a 1% significance level for the FE model.
As we have argued earlier, the inclusion of ˜ for public goods may cause problems.
Hence, it seems appropriate to exclude public goods from the estimation. We constructed
a model in which the definition of private goods is Private III. In other words, we let
Ii ≡{A,E,H , J}. In this model, we cannot statistically reject equations (11) or (12) for
both the OLS and FE models as reported in the middle of Table 3, suggesting that our
specification is reasonable.
10The term 	2 t¯H is dropped from equation (10) in the FE models, because t¯H is a constant for each H. The OLS
results are similar to the FE results as reported in Fujii and Ishikawa (2011). Further, as with the reduced-form
estimation, the exogeneity of the regressors was not rejected in 2SLS regressions. Thus, we hereafter take the number
of children as exogenous.
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TABLE 3
Main regression results of equation (10) for the double-income sample
all w˜ Pr. III w˜ No w˜
	0 Constant −0.004 (0.073) 0.024 (0.070) 0.001 (0.000)
	1 #children −0.384* (0.179) −0.309 (0.170) −0.186* (0.081)
Fem. ratio 7.454 (8.970) 5.997 (9.584) −6.864 (5.577)
ln Y 0.220 (0.217) 0.336 (0.222) 0.065 (0.153)
inc. share 2.451** (0.547) 2.196** (0.597) 2.346** (0.401)
	3 t× (#children) 0.856 (1.093) 0.661 (1.030) 0.404 (0.567)
t× (Fem. ratio) −37.538 (53.549) −24.685 (57.907) 45.415 (30.757)
t× ln Y −1.629 (1.388) −2.262 (1.426) −0.984 (0.992)
t×(inc. share) −2.687 (3.027) −1.629 (3.248) −1.234 (2.164)
	4 ln y −0.144* (0.058) −0.094 (0.071) −0.046 (0.049)
Obs. 1250 1250 2061
R2 0.229 0.163 0.124
Equation (11)/equation (12), Pr. I 0.000/0.013 — 0.238/0.867
Equation (11)/equation (12), Pr. II 0.000/0.015 — 0.238/0.981
Equation (11)/equation (12), Pr. III 0.552/0.007 0567/0.117 0.238/0.388
Impact of one more child 0.052 (0.026) 0.043 (0.021) 0.026 (0.013)
Impact of +1 % inc. share 0.425 (0.132) 0.403 (0.111) 0.445 (0.115)
Notes: Fixed-effects estimation. Robust standard errors in the parentheses.
*Significant at a 5% level.
**Significant at a 1% level.
On the right side of Table 3, we report the estimation results for a model with all the
terms involving ˜ dropped. As with the previous model, we cannot statistically reject
equation (11) or (12), regardless of the definition of private goods we employ. Hence, our
preferredmodels for the structural-form specification are those with Private III ˜ and those
with no ˜.
To make the results for the structural form comparable to those for the reduced form,
we have computed the impact of an additional child. To do so, we add one to z1H and
predict s˜*H for each H and , using the estimated coefficients and regression residual.
Subsequently, the predicted change in the sharing rule due to an additional child can be
expressed as (1+ exp(−s¯*H +s˜*H))−1− sH. We report the sample average and the sample
standard deviation of the predicted impact of the additional child at the bottom of Table 3.
The average impact of a child for no ˜models is about−2.6 percentage points, which
is almost exactly the same as the reduced-form estimates. On the other hand, in models
with Private III ˜, the estimated average impact of the additional child is about 50% higher
in absolute value. While the difference in these two point estimates are too small to draw
conclusions, a plausible reason for this difference is that the categorical private expenditure
share ˜ may be capturing the effect of (otherwise unobservable) bargaining power in the
household, which is not captured by no ˜ models.
In all the models, the predicted impact of children is negative for all, or nearly all, the
observations. Even when the estimated coefficients 	ˆ1 and 	ˆ3 are not significant at a 5%
level, the average impact of an additional child is negative and significant.
We have also calculated the impact of the change in the wife’s disposable income share.
Regardless of the model, a single percentage point increase in her disposable income share
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is associated with an increase of more than 0.4 percentage points in the sharing rule,
rejecting the income-pooling hypothesis. This number is comparable to the reduced-form
estimates.
The structural-form specification provides insights not offered by the reduced-form
specification. First, we can test the PIGL preference by testing r=0. Noting that the point
estimate of r is 	ˆ4, this test is straightforward. In the model with all ˜, PIGL preference
can be rejected at a 5% significance level, but these models may bemisspecified. However,
in the other two models that we prefer, we cannot reject the PIGL preference. Therefore,
∂s*/∂* may indeed be constant, which is consistent with the reduced-form specification.
Second, we can verify the validity of equation (10) by checking whether |r|	1 holds,
because it is derived as a first-order approximation to equation (8). Given that the largest
absolute value for the point estimate of r in our preferred models is only 0.094, equa-
tion (10) is indeed valid.
Finally, we find that the point estimate of r is negative, though it is not significant at a
5% level in our preferred models. According to the point estimates for our preferred mod-
els, married women are more risk averse than married men by 4.6–9.9 % in the coefficient
of relative risk aversion. This finding is consistent with previous studies on the gender
difference in risk attitudes in financial decision-making, which generally find that women
aremore risk averse thanmen (Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1999; Dwyer, Gilkesan and List,
2002; Croson and Gneezy, 2009) even though the difference may depend on the situation
(Schubert et al., 1999).
Our structural-form estimation has two advantages over these previous studies. First,
research based on financial decision-making does not necessarily reveal the gender differ-
ences in risk tolerance, because men and women may have different options to cope with
risk. Our structural-form specification is estimated from the consumption expenditure, and
thus, it captures the gender differences in the coping strategies better. Second, our model
allows us to measure the gender difference in risk aversion in a quantitatively meaningful
manner.
Some robustness checks
To check the robustness of ourmain results, we first looked at the impact of censoring in the
reduced-form model. To this end, we considered a pooled Tobit model and random-effect
Tobit model. The estimated coefficient on the number of children for each of these models
is similar to the pooled OLS estimate. This is not surprising, because only 18 observations
are censored at zero and none at one for the double-income sample.11
We also considered five different alternative specifications for the reduced-formmodel.
In thefirst alternative specification,we replaced the number of childrenby separate numbers
of boys and girls, respectively. We find that the boys’ impact on intrahousehold resource
allocation is not significantly different from impact of girls.
In the other four alternative specifications, we simply added a set of regressors to
the baseline model presented in section IV, namely (i) the average age of children, (ii)
11Detailed estimation results for the regressions discussed in this subsection are reported in Fujii and Ishikawa
(2011)
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the dummy variables for the presence of either side of the parents, (iii) the location of
residence, (iv), whether money is managed primarily by the wife and (v) the number of
desired children. None of these additional regressors is statistically significant whether we
use pooled-OLS regressions or FE regressions. The inclusion of these additional regressors
did not alter our main findings.
Our study questions the validity of sociological studies such as Pahl (2005) focused on
the management of household finances to study bargaining within the household. The wife
manages household finances in the overwhelming majority of households in Japan, but
this fact tells us little about the outcome of the intrahousehold resource allocation. Hence,
it is important to clearly distinguish between bargaining and management of household
finances.
Our estimation relies upon the weak separability assumption, and thus, we also tested
this assumption by checking whether the composition of public goods is jointly significant.
We included the expenditure shares j =pcj xcj /pcxc of each public good j∈ Ic within the total
public-goods expenditure following the Public III definition. In Column (1) of Table 4, we
have included all the public-goods shares except for other miscellaneous. The coefficients
on the public goods are not jointly significant at a 5% level. Hence, our empirical results
are consistent with the weak separability assumption.
Thus far, we have only considered the average impact of childbirth to keep the analysis
and presentation simple. However, the impact of an additional child may depend on the
number of children already in the household. In Column (2) of Table 4, we include in the
set of regressors the number of children squared. Our results show that the negative impact
of childbirth on the wife’s private expenditure share peaks for the first child. While the
second child still has a negative impact, the impact of the third child is close to zero. The
inclusion of the number of children squared does not substantively change other findings
in this paper.
TABLE 4
Regression results of equation (3) for the double-income sample
(1) (2)
	3 # children −0.057** (0.019) −0.096** (0.020)
Fem. ratio 0.210 (0.998) −0.007 (0.729)
ln Y 0.006 (0.027) −0.019 (0.018)
Inc. share 0.412** (0.059) 0.423** (0.044)
Public expenditure share B (Hse) 0.021 (0.031)
Public expenditure share C (Util) 0.003 (0.031)
Public expenditure share D (Furn) −0.030 (0.042)
Public expenditure share F (Med) 0.087* (0.041)
Public expenditure share G (Trans) 0.044 (0.037)
Public expenditure share I (Educ) −0.040 (0.027)
(# children)2 0.022** (0.005)
Obs. 2079 2079
R2 0.123 0.100
Notes: Fixed-effects estimation. Robust standard errors in the parentheses. 	0, 	1 and 	2 omitted to save space.
*Significant at a 5% level.
**Significant at a 1% level.
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The results discussed above are based on a subsample of double-income couples. One
natural question is what happens if we include non-double-income couples. The estima-
tion can be substantially more difficult for at least two reasons. First, we do not have the
wage rate for those who are non-salaried; hence it is difficult to objectively value their
domestic labour and leisure time in monetary terms. Second, labour force participation
may be correlated with the unobservable bargaining power, which simultaneously affects
the intrahousehold resource allocation. As a result, there may be additional endogeneity
problems.
Despite these issues, we ran both reduced-form and structural-form regressions under
the narrow definition of income and expenditure for the entire sample. In both cases and
under a range of alternative specifications, one additional child was associated with a
decrease of at least 2.7 percentage points in woman’s share of private expenditure. How-
ever, the structural-form estimates fail to pass the specification test in equation (11). As
a consequence, we cannot draw strong conclusions about the whole sample. Our findings
do indicate, however, that the impact of children on the wife’s private expenditure share
is still negative for the whole sample.
Exploring the sources of the impact
Childbirth tends to reduce the private expenditure share ofwomen and thisfinding is robust.
Let us now explore three plausible explanations for this. First, our results may be driven
by the relative changes in the value of men and women in the marriage market. Women
may lose their market value in the marriage market much faster than men after the first
child is born.
The second explanation is preference change. We have assumed that the distribution
factors are sharing-rule neutral. Suppose instead, ‘women cherish children more than men
do.’ This may be because the more children the couple has, the more women would value
public goodswhilemen’s preferences remain unchanged. In this case, evenwhen the Pareto
weight remains constant, the sharing rule may decrease.
The third explanation is the additional sphere of bargaining. Some authors suggest
that women tend to be emotionally more strongly attached to children than men (Zea-
nah, 1989, Mahony, 1996). Hence, women may give up their private expenditure share
to have more say in raising their children. In other words, childbirth may create an addi-
tional sphere of bargaining, which is substitutable for, but not captured by, the sharing
rule.
We put these three alternative (but not mutually exclusive) explanations to the test. For
the first explanation, we included in the set of regressors the number of male and female
friends of the wife,12 as a proxy for her value in themarriagemarket. The number of friends
may be a reasonable proxy, because it would reflect her popularity and the network on
which she can fall back on in case of divorce. On the other hand, it does not reflect the
quality of friends, which may also be important. In addition, the number of friends may be
endogenous, because the attractiveness of the wife could positively affect both the sharing
rule and the number of friends, overstating the impact of the latter.
12We do not have data on the husband’s friends.
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Despite these potential caveats, we carried out regressions with the number of friends,
the results of which are reported in Columns (1) and (2) in Table 5. Note that we have
taken the logarithm of the number of friends plus one, since the number of friends varied
substantially over the respondents. We added one to avoid taking the logarithm of zero.
However, the qualitative nature of our results as discussed below is not affected by this
transformation.
We find that the coefficient on male friends is very small and not statistically signifi-
cant. In contrast, the impact of female friends is much larger, but not statistically significant
in the FE model. Further, the coefficients on the female ratio, which would be inversely
related to the value of the woman in the marriage market, are also statistically insignificant.
Therefore, we lack evidence to support the first explanation.
For the second explanation, we use the respondents’ attitudes towards eight domains
of life, including (i) to live, (ii) to spend, (iii) to work, (iv) to raise, (v) to heal, (vi) to
play, (vii) to learn and (viii) to interact. Each respondent was asked to answer how impor-
tant each domain is on a five-point scale, where smaller numbers indicate domains valued
more highly by the respondent. Each domain was asked independently, so that all the eight
domains can be ‘extremely important’or ‘not important at all’ for a given respondent. Note
that these questions were not asked in 1994.
We assume that these variables are not distribution factors but preference shifters,
which are not necessarily sharing-rule neutral. Thus, if our results are driven by preference
shifters that are systematically correlated with the sharing rule (and thus not sharing-rule
neutral), these variables would capture the variations in the sharing rule.
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 5 report the regression results with the attitudes variables.
The coefficients on these attitude indicators are jointly significant in the pooled-OLSmodel
even at a 0.1% level, whereas they are not significant even at a 10% level in the FE model.
This observation can be explained by the selection in the marriage market. In other words,
those women who prioritize play tend to have a higher sharing rule, simply because they
would be willing to marry only those men who would accept a lower private expenditure
share. On the other hand, once the woman is married, the preference change does not alter
the sharing rule. Thus, we have no evidence to support the second explanation, either.
For the third explanation, we use as a regressor the extent to which the wife makes
decisions on the disciplining and training of the children on a five-point scale from 1 (only
the husband makes the decision) to 5 (only the wife makes the decision). One problem
with this question is that this variable is relevant only to couples with children. Hence, we
had to drop observations without children.
Columns (5) and (6) in Table 5 report the regression results with decisions on chil-
dren. While the coefficient on the decisions on children is not statistically significant in
both the pooled OLS and FE models, the point estimates are moderately large in absolute
value, and the signs of the coefficients are opposite. From the cross-sectional perspective,
those women who have a higher (unobserved) bargaining power would be more likely to
make decisions on children and enjoy a larger sharing rule. On the other hand, there may
be substitution between the sharing rule and decisions on children for a given couple, as
suggested by the FE regression model. We also find that the coefficient on the number of
children is much smaller in the FE model than other models. All these observations are
consistent with the third explanation.
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V. Discussion and conclusions
Unlike most other studies on intrahousehold allocation in economic and sociology, we
directly study the impact of childbirth on intrahousehold resource allocation. We have
devised reduced-form and structural-form estimation equations built upon a collective
model of the household. We exploited a unique data set in Japan to address a number of
econometric issues typically faced by researchers.
As shown by the summary statistics, both the husband andwife make sacrifices for their
children. With the arrival of the first child, each of them, on average, spends more time
on domestic work, less time on leisure and less money for private purposes. However,
the burden of children is disproportionately on the wife’s shoulders, with the disparity
increasing with additional children. The question is whether this observation is true even
after controlling for the changes in wife’s income share and other factors. Our empirical
results affirm this, and this conclusion is robust.
In both reduced-form and structural-form specifications, each additional childwas asso-
ciatedwith a decrease of at least 2 percentage points in the wife’s private expenditure share,
after controlling for various factors including her share of total disposable income.We have
considered the possible endogeneity issue due to the wife’s unobservable bargaining power
–which is positively correlatedwithboth thenumberof children andher private expenditure
share.However,wedonotfind strong statistical evidence for such an endogeneity problem.
We have also investigated the causes of the decrease in the wife’s private expenditure
share. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that the reduced sharing rule is substi-
tuted by (or compensated for) the increased say in decisions concerning disciplining and
training of the children. Our empirical results do not provide support for the explanations
based on the marriage market and preference change, though our results should be taken
with a grain of salt because themeasureswe use to test these explanations are far from ideal.
Besides measuring the impact of childbirth on intrahousehold resource allocation and
analysing its cause, our study makes some additional contributions. First, we have shown
that a single percentage point increase in the wife’s disposable income share is associated
with an increase of around 0.4 percentage points in her share of private expenditure. Our
study clearly rejects the income-pooling hypothesis as with many of the previous studies.
Second, our structural-form estimation allows us to test the PIGL preference, which is
not rejected in our preferred models. Third, our study has also developed a way to mea-
sure gender difference in the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Our approach offers a
completely new way to analyse the gender differences in risk attitudes.
Our study also highlights the usefulness of the ‘beneficiary format’ in the expenditure
survey. The data on intrahousehold resource allocation collected with the ‘beneficiary for-
mat’can generate interesting studies, which were not previously possible. In general, panel
data sets aremore desirable than cross-section datasets because the former allows us to con-
trol for unobservable heterogeneity at the household level, including how the respondent as-
signs the beneficiary of the expenditure. However, the pooledOLSmodel and the FEmodel
provide similar results for the majority of our analysis. This indicates that cross-sectional
analysis based only on one survey round may provide meaningful estimates. Collecting
panel datawith the ‘beneficiary format’may, therefore, start paying off even in the short run.
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